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Reexamining the Yahoo! Litigations:
Toward an Effects Test for Determining
International Cyberspace Jurisdiction
By MATTHEW CHivvIs*
Citizens want their government to prevent them from harming one
another on the Internet and to block Internet harms from abroad.
Companies need a legal environment that guarantees stability in
the network and permits Internet commerce to flourish.
Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu'
THE INTERNET HAS POSED A NEW RIDDLE for international ju-
risdiction disputes. Before the Internet, parties facing suit in foreign
jurisdictions often had significant and purposeful physical contacts
that justified the foreign country's exercise of jurisdiction.2 But grow-
ing use of the Internet has created a world where an actor may cause
harm in another country through contacts that are entirely elec-
tronic. 3 Further, the online conduct the foreign country views as
harmful may be entirely legal and without liability in the jurisdiction
where the actor resides. 4 The Internet allows an actor to reach out
across cyberspace, contacting a broader audience than the one toward
which the actor targets the bulk of its content. While these contacts
may be intentional insomuch as the actor makes a conscious choice to
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1. JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM Wu, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A
BORDERLESS WORLD, at viii (2006). The authors, Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu, are among
the preeminent scholars in the field of cyberspace law.
2. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987); Hart-
ford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993); see also United States v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945).
3. Many content and service-oriented sites are based solely in one country but are
accessible in many. These sites do not sell products to parties in other countries. Instead,
they rely on advertising revenues as a source of income.
4. See, e.g., Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d
1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 2006); see also discussion infra Part I.
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use the Internet as a medium of communication, they are not "pur-
poseful" as courts have previously defined the concept.5
If foreign countries exercise jurisdiction over internet actors
based on the perceived harm from electronic contacts alone, then
every internet actor may find it necessary to tailor its online activity to
the legal confines of the most restrictive country, which it reaches
electronically. 6 As a result, these countries may inadvertently help to
create an Internet of the lowest common denominator, a failure of
the grand experiment in cyberspace. 7
For example, imagine an Internet where a regime with restrictive
regulations on speech, such as China, exercises control over internet
content available to users throughout the world. 8 Such an imposition
could severely restrict internet speech outside the physical borders of
the country itself, potentially curtailing the activities of those who re-
side in localities with strong free speech protections. The results of
Yahool's litigation in France suggest that such a reality may soon ex-
ist,9 and in some respects it is already upon us. In 2002, Yahoo! signed
a document called the Public Pledge on Self-Discipline for the Chinese In-
dusty, promising to "inspect and monitor the information on domes-
tic and foreign Websites" and to "refuse access to those Websites that
disseminate harmful information" to the internet users of China. 10
To avoid the ill effects of "contacts only"" jurisdiction as de-
scribed above, this Comment proposes that courts should use an ef-
5. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (plurality opinion) (finding that the "'substantial connec-
tion,' between the defendant and the forum State necessary for a finding of minimum
contacts must come about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum
State" (citations omitted) and that "placement of a product into the stream of commerce,
without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum
State").
6. See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1394 (1996) (explaining that "territorially local claims to a right to
restrict online transactions... should be resisted"); see alsoJohn T. Delacourt, The Interna-
tional Impact ofInternet Regulation, 38 HARV. INT'L LJ. 207 (1997).
7. SeeJohnson & Post, supra note 6, at 1394-95 (arguing that the actions of territorial
sovereigns may harm the ability of "the Net to realize its full promise").
8. GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 1, at 9. China has demanded that companies, such
as Yahoo!, "filter materials that might be harmful or threatening to Party rule." See id.
9. See infra Part I.
10. GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 1, at 9. The executive director of the Human Rights
Watch does not approve of Yahoo!'s actions that help "to identify and prevent the transmis-
sion of virtually any information that Chinese authorities or companies deem objectiona-
ble." Id.
11. This Comment uses the term "contacts only" to denote instances where a court,
without inquiring into intent, bases jurisdiction on one or more contacts perceived to have
caused harm within the country. "Contacts only" jurisdiction requires power on the part of
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fects test when deciding international civil disputes involving solely
cyberspace harms. 12 Such a test would permit jurisdiction only when
an actor (1) commits an intentional action, (2) directed at the forum
country, and (3) causes harm that the actor knew was likely to be suf-
fered in the forum country. 3 In other words, a potential litigant must
prove elements of (1) "intent," (2) "targeting," and (3) "foreseeable
harm" in order to hail an internet actor to a foreign jurisdiction.
Part I of this Comment outlines the history of Yahoo!'s battle with
La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme ("LICRA") and the
Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the Calder effects test.14 Part I also
advances the effects test as a possible solution for jurisdiction disputes
based on cyberspace harm. Part II takes this Comment outside the
scope of the Yahoo! litigations, reviewing other possible jurisdictional
approaches and analyzing their benefits and detriments. Part III ar-
gues that the Ninth Circuit's effects test for determining jurisdiction
over a foreign party offers more benefits than other approaches while
still being capable of implementation. Part III also analogizes the rele-
vance of the effects test in cyberspace disputes to its relevance in anti-
trust disputes, and it illustrates how other countries have used the
effects test. This Comment concludes that courts can and should use
the effects test.
a sovereign to enforce a judgment against the actor. See infra Parts I.A., II.A. This term
differs from the minimum contacts test mentioned infra Part II.B. as it fails to take comity
interests, specifically that of courtesy between nations, into account and lacks a place for a
normative judgment on reasonableness. Some commentators refer to a "contacts only"
method of establishing jurisdiction as an effects test. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith, Against
Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 1199, 1208 n.36 (1998). However, those commentators'
version of an effects test differs from the one proposed here, as it does not require inten-
tional conduct or targeting. It only requires harmful effects to have been felt in the forum.
Id.
12. This Comment does not advance the "effects test" as a workable solution for crimi-
nal violations of law. A country arguably has a greater interest in exercising jurisdiction to
the full extent of its sovereign power when, for example, an actor perpetrates fraud or the
exploitation of children via the Internet.
13. The original version of this test appears in the defamation case, Calder v. Jones, 465
U.S. 783, 789 (1983) ('jurisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper in California based
on the 'effects' of their Florida conduct in California.").
14. See id.
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I. The Yahoo! Litigations: A Paradigm Outlining One
Application of the Calder Effects Test
A. Yahoo!'s Legal Trouble in France-The French Approach to
Cyberspace Jurisdiction
Mark Knobel, a French activist who has devoted his life to fight-
ing anti-Semitism and neo-Nazism, made it his business to ensure that
those who provide internet services in France obey French laws con-
cerning the promulgation of racist speech. 15 In 1998, he discovered
hate sites on America Online ("AOL") and threatened a public rela-
tions war. 16 Fearing negative publicity, AOL quickly pulled the sites. 17
Two years later, while engaging in a search of the Web for content
illegal in his country, Knobel found Nazi memorabilia on the auction
site of Yahoo.com.' 8 Knobel thought that if he acted in coordination
with LICRA (which, when translated, means the "International
League against Racism"), Yahoo! would respond in a manner similar
to AOL.19 He was wrong. Yahoo!'s management held the belief that
while there are "many countries and many laws," there is 'just one
Internet. 20
In early April 2000, LICRA sent Yahoo! a cease and desist letter,
threatening litigation against Yahoo! in France within eight days. 21
The letter directed Yahoo! to remove all material considered illegal
under French law from Yahoo.com and Yahoo.fr or face litigation. 22
Only five days later, LICRA filed suit against Yahoo! and its French
subsidiary in the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris ("the French
court").23
LICRA advanced a simple claim: "French law does not permit ra-
cism in writing, on television or on the radio, and [we] see no reason
15. GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 1, at 1-2.
16. Id. at 1.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 2.
20. Id. at 2.
21. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199,
1202 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
22. Id. The letter stated in part that "[ulnless you cease presenting nazi objects for
sale within 8 days, we shall size [sic] the competent jurisdiction to force your company to
abide by the law." Id.
23. Id. The Tribunal de Grande Instance acts as the basic French trial court of general
civil jurisdiction. Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process,
and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 1181, 1262-63 n.407
(2005).
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to have an exception for the Internet."24 The French court agreed
and summarily found that the presence of Nazi memorabilia on Ya-
hoo!-hosted internet sites caused sufficient harm for France to exert
jurisdiction over Yahoo!.2 5 The court imposed a fine of one hundred
thousand euros on Yahoo! for every day that the Nazi memorabilia
remained accessible through Yahoo.com and Yahoo.fr. 26
Acknowledging the ability of the French court to liquidate the
assets of its French subsidiary, Yahoo! removed the offending material
from both its France and United States based sites.27 The litigation
between LICRA and Yahoo! then took another turn as Yahoo! went on
the offensive.
B. Yahoo! Sues in the United States-The Ninth Circuit's
Approach to Cyberspace Jurisdiction
In December 2001, Yahoo! filed suit against LICRA in the Federal
District Court for the Northern District of California, seeking a declar-
atory judgment that the French court's orders were unenforceable in
the United States.2 8 Once again, jurisdiction was an issue, but now
LICRA faced adjudication in a distant forum.2 9
After the district court ruled that it properly had jurisdiction over
LICRA, the French group filed a timely appeal to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals.30 On its first appeal, LICRA won dismissal of Ya-
hoo!'s action; a Ninth Circuit panel held that the district court "had
no personal jurisdiction over the French parties and that France had
every right to hold Yahoo! accountable in France."'31 However, the
24. GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 1, at 5 (citing Lee Dembart, Boundaries on Nazi Sites
Remain Unsettled in Internet's Global Village, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 29, 2000, at 7).
25. T.G.I. Paris, May 22, 2000, translated in PATRICIA L. BELLIA ET AL., CYBERLAW:
PROBLEMS OF POLICY AND JURISPRUDENCE IN THE INFORMATION AGE 105 (2d ed. 2004). The
French court stated: "Whereas the damage was suffered in France ... [this court is] there-
fore competent to exercise jurisdiction over the present dispute ...." Id.
26. Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1203. The French court later reduced the penalty to 100,000
francs per day. Id. at 1204; see also GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 1, at 8 ("[Yahoo!] had until
February 2001 to comply before facing fines ....").
27. GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 1, at 8; see also Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1204 ("The court
reserve[d] the possible liquidation of the penalty' against Yahoo!.").
28. Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1204.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1205 (LICRA's appeal also involved issues of ripeness and abstention).
31. Joel R. Reidenberg, Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1951,
1952 (2005); see also Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 379
F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2004).
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panel decision was not the Ninth Circuit's final say on the matter as
the court agreed to rehear the decision en banc.32
At the en banc hearing, the only issue a majority of the court
agreed upon was that the district court had personal jurisdiction.33 Of
the eightjudges who found jurisdiction, only five thought the case was
ripe for adjudication.34 Overall, a majority of six judges voted to dis-
miss: three on the basis of lack ofjurisdiction and three on the basis of
lack of ripeness. 35
For the jurisdictional analysis, LICRA asked that the Ninth Circuit
use the Calder effects test,36 a proposition with which the Ninth Circuit
agreed. 37 In Calder, the Supreme Court found that the defendants'
intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at the
forum state, making jurisdiction in that forum proper.38
LICRA argued that the district court improperly exercised juris-
diction because LICRA's contacts with California were not "tortious or
otherwise wrongful," 39 which it viewed as a requirement of the effects
test.40 The Ninth Circuit disagreed with LICRA on that point, noting
"we do not read Calder necessarily to require in purposeful direction
cases that all (or even any) jurisdictionally relevant effects have been
caused by wrongful acts."41 The court then found that the act of ob-
taining interim orders from the French court, which directed Yahoo!
to change its website in California, satisfied the effects test.42 It was on
this basis that the majority held jurisdiction proper in California.43
32. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 399 F.3d 1010 (9th
Cir. 2005) (granting rehearing en banc); Yahoo', 433 F.3d at 1201.
33. Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1201.
34. Id.
35. Id. LICRA claimed it had no immediate intention of enforcing its judgment
against Yahoo!. Id. at 1204.
36. Id. at 1206. Interestingly, LICRA argued for a jurisdiction test that, had it been
applied in France, might not have resulted in LICRA being able to obtain jurisdiction over
Yahoo! in France.
37. Id. at 1207.
38. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1983).
39. Yahoo.!, 433 F.3d at 1207.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1208.
42. Id. at 1209-11.
43. Id. at 1211.
[Vol. 41
THE EFFECTS TEST FOR CYBERSPACE DISPUTES
C. Comparing the Approaches-Determining Jurisdiction Using
the Effects Test
The Ninth Circuit's endorsement of the effects test for cyber-
space disputes is noteworthy. While the court did not require "wrong-
ful acts," it required more than the French court, which based
jurisdiction solely on the harm suffered and failed to reflect on the
intent of the foreign actor.44 The Ninth Circuit considered three ele-
ments before finding personal jurisdiction proper,45 interpreting the
Calder effects test as providing a basis for jurisdiction when: "[T] he
defendant ... [has] (1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly
aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows
is likely to be suffered in the forum state."46
Prior to the Ninth Circuit's Yahoo! decision en banc, one promi-
nent commentator on the Yahoo! cases, Joel Reidenberg, suggested,
"[T]o the extent that an Internet actor strives to target users in a for-
eign jurisdiction, the foreign forum can assert territorial jurisdiction
and apply the forum's law."'47 Although this standard appears similar
to the effects test, Reidenberg further elaborated that "[i]n this con-
text, the French decision is an ordinary exercise of a widely accepted
practice in the United States" and that "[a] U.S. court faced with the
same facts would yield a similar result. ' '4 8
Reidenberg accurately described the Ninth Circuit panel's ap-
proach in Yahoo! as finding jurisdiction where an actor "strived to tar-
get," or rather, purposefully directed its actions at the forum. 49
However, the French court failed to engage in similar analysis. The
court, in its May 22, 2000 order, specifically recognized that the "unin-
tentional nature" of Yahoo!'s wrong in France "is apparent. '5 0 Thus,
contrary to Reidenberg's prediction, if the French court had used the
Ninth Circuit's test, LICRA likely would have failed to establish juris-
44. For a discussion of the harm from Yahoo! that France perceived, see supra note 25
and accompanying text.
45. Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1206, 1211.
46. Id. at 1206 (citations omitted). This Comment refers to the three elements as (1)
intent, (2) targeting, and (3) foreseeable harm.
47. Joel R. Reidenberg, Yahoo and Democracy on the Internet, 42JURIMETRJCSJ. 261, 271
(2002) (emphasis added).
48. Id.
49. Id. The Ninth Circuit refers to the Calder test as both "the effects test" and as the
test for "purposeful direction." Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1206, 1208. One of the test's elements
requires targeting. Id.
50. BELLIA ET AL., supra note 25, at 105 (translating the French order).
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diction because Yahoo!'s actions met neither the intent element nor
the targeting element.
Yahoo! did not "strive to target" France with racist speech. In-
stead, Yahoo!'s United States based site, Yahoo.com, primarily
targeted an American audience. The language of the Yahoo.com por-
tal proves this fact: it is in English, not French.
Moreover, Yahoo.com's American audience enjoys the protec-
tions of the First Amendment, including the right to view many forms
of content that are illegal in other countries. 5' When an actor (such as
Yahoo.fr) purposefully directs its actions at a forum (in this case
France) and causes harm in the forum (by displaying racist speech,
for example), it seems equitable for the actor to face suit in that fo-
rum. On the other hand, when an actor (such as Yahoo.com) pur-
posely directs its actions to its home forum (which is the United
States) and incidental harm is felt elsewhere (in this case France), it
seems unfair to subject that actor to suit in that incidental forum.
The French court deviated from this precept when it exercised
jurisdiction over Yahoo!'s United States focused company (as well as
its French subsidiary) based on incidental harm alone. Yahoo!'s por-
tal, Yahoo.fr, immediately took steps to abide by French law to a level
acceptable in France by removing all of the illegal material from its
site.52 However, Yahoo! also removed all of the offending material
from its United States based site. 53 While the French court subse-
quently found that Yahoo! complied with its order "in large mea-
sure,"54 free speech in the United States suffered as a result.5
5
If Yahoo!'s response to the litigation in France is simply a precur-
sor to a broader trend of self-censorship wherein internet companies
submit to the standards imposed by distant forums based on inciden-
tal contact alone, such constraints will create an Internet of the lowest
51. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) ("If the First Amendment means
anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own
house, what books he may read or what films he may watch.").
52. See Yahoo, 433 F.3d at 1204 ("The court specifically stated that it was not awarding
any expenses or costs against Yahoo! France .... ").
53. GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 1, at 8.
54. Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1204; GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 1, at 8.
55. For a discussion of the harm from Yahoo! that France perceived, see supra notes
24-27 and accompanying text. Yahoo! removed the offending material from its website
even though the material likely would have received protection from the First Amendment
in the United States. See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 1, at 8.
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common denominator. 56 The most restrictive laws will be the laws of
cyberspace. 57 New internet content and services may be stifled, aban-
doned, or tied up in litigation if courts continue to hold foreign in-
ternet actors accountable for unforeseeable harms to unintended
audiences.
In the instant case, France benefited from Yahoo!'s compliance
with its laws, but next time it could be French companies and citizens
that suffer when hailed to the United States for actions they did not
direct at American internet users. To avoid a future such as this,
courts in cases involving cyberspace harm by a foreign actor should
use an effects test like the one formulated by the Ninth Circuit when it
considered Yahoo! en banc.58
Other possible approaches for finding jurisdiction exist, but they
may stymie the potential of cyberspace. Other tests often dispropor-
tionately punish large content owners with assets abroad or create an-
alytical and notice problems. As seen above, they may also threaten
internet speech. International solutions, when effective, may fail to en-
franchise those subject to their determinations. Although, as illus-
trated below, the alternatives do have some merits, which bear
consideration, the effects test nonetheless remains the best choice.
II. Alternative Approaches for Establishing International
Cyberspace Jurisdiction
Some have considered cyberspace a separate realm and have ad-
vocated that it be regulated by an adjudicatory system divorced from
territorial governments; 59 but, by and large, courts have not adopted
this view. 60 Instead, as Jack Goldsmith correctly forecast,61 territorial
56. "Internet firms and users confronted with a bevy of conflicting national laws could
reasonably be expected to comply with the strictest among them in order to avoid legal
jeopardy." GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 1, at 6.
57. Id.
58. Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1206; see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
59. Johnson & Post, supra note 6, at 1367.
60. See, e.g., Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998)
(finding jurisdiction in a United States trademark case); Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick
(2002) 210 C.L.R. 575 (Austl.) (finding jurisdiction over a United States corporation in an
Australian defamation case); Richardson v. Schwarzenegger, [2004] EWAHC (QB) 2422
(Eng.) (finding jurisdiction over California residents in the United Kingdom); BELLIA ET
AL., supra note 25 and accompanying text (finding jurisdiction over Yahoo! for harms
caused in France).
61. Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 1200-02.
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governments have asserted control over internet actors,6 2 especially
when they perceive these actors to have caused harm within their
countries. 63 The subsections below consider alternative approaches to
the effects test, which the courts of a territorial sovereign may use for
determining jurisdiction over foreign internet actors.
In addressing the benefits and detriments of these approaches,
this section places the alternatives along a continuum with respect to
how well each addresses concerns traditionally associated with comity.
Comity is "the recognition which one nation allows within its territory
to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having
due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the
rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protec-
tion of its laws."64 The first jurisdictional approach this section dis-
cusses, which utilizes presence and quasi in rem, obeys the ideals of
comity the least. The second approach, minimum contacts, provides
only a slightly better solution in terms of comity. The last approach,
international agreement, arguably best addresses comity concerns.
As discussed below, although each alternative has something to
recommend it, none performs as well as the effects test at promoting
comity interests and other benefits while avoiding problems of
implementation.
A. Presence and Quasi In Rem-Jurisdiction Based on the Power
to Enforce
A territorial sovereign has the power to control persons and prop-
erty located within its territory. 65 By using that power, "[a] nation re-
tains the ability to regulate the extraterritorial sources of local harms
through regulation of persons and property within its territory. '66 Ef-
fectively, the power to enforce a legal judgment is the power to decide
a legal issue. The Yahoo! litigation in France demonstrates the two
levers a nation may use to attain jurisdiction to serve its own interests;
Yahoo! feared the French court's power over its property and employ-
ees.67 The company knew that the French court could liquidate its
62. For a discussion of how France has exercised jurisdiction over an internet com-
pany from the United States, see supra Part I.A.
63. See, e.g., BELLIA ET AL., supra note 25, noting the harm from Yahoo! that France
perceived; see also Reidenberg, supra note 47, at 271.
64. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
65. See generally Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
66. Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding Significance of Territorial Sovereignty, 5
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 475, 481 (1998).
67. See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 1, at 8.
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assets in France and that its executives would be subject to process
while traveling within France's borders. 68
In the United States, jurisdiction derived from power over prop-
erty is traditionally known as quasi in rem,69 and jurisdiction derived
from power over a person is known as presence. 70 Both are old means
of establishing jurisdiction in the United States, and the more modern
minimum contacts analysis has largely supplanted them in United
States courts.71
The Supreme Court's decision in Pennoyer v. Neff72 set the stage
for the long lasting practice of determining interstate jurisdiction
based on physical presence. 73 As the Supreme Court later stated in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington:74 "Historically the jurisdiction of
courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on their de facto
power over the defendant's person. Hence his presence within the
territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a
judgment personally binding on him. ' 75 Pennoyer also set the stage for
quasi in rem jurisdiction in the United States. In Pennoyer, the Su-
preme Court noted: "The State, having within her territory property
of a non-resident, may hold and appropriate it to satisfy the claims of
her citizens against him; and her tribunals may inquire into his obliga-
tions to the extent necessary to control the disposition of that
property. '76
In the United States, ajurisdictional approach based on presence
and quasi in rem would fail to advance present-day comity interests
because it would be rooted in decisions issued over one hundred years
68. Id.
69. This Comment uses the term quasi in rem to refer to a jurisdictional scheme
wherein a sovereign holds property "for ransom" in order to exercise power to decide a
legal issue unrelated or only tenuously related to the property (exactly the type of enforce-
ment power the French court's order threatened against Yahoo!). See, e.g., GOLDSMITH &
Wu, supra note 1, at 8; BELLIA ET AL., supra note 25, at 105 (translating the French order).
True in rem jurisdiction, wherein a sovereign exercises jurisdiction over property solely to
settle issues directly relating to the property (such as succession), is arguably a more legiti-
mate exercise ofjurisdiction. See Cable News Network L.P. v. CNNews.com, 162 F. Supp. 2d
484, 490-91 (2001). Currently, in the United States, quasi in rem jurisdiction denies due
process unless a minimum contacts test is also satisfied. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,
207 (1977).
70. See generally Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 714; Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945).
71. See infra Part II.B.
72. 95 U.S. 714.
73. Id. at 724.
74. 326 U.S. 310.
75. Id. at 316 (italics omitted) (citing Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 714).
76. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 714.
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ago. 77 At that time, communities within the United States were rela-
tively isolated and independent. 7 As advances in communications
and transportation developed, presence and quasi in rem did not
grant jurisdiction in cases where an actor caused harm in a forum but
did not reside or have property in the forum. 79 Further, absent from
the analysis in such an approach is whether jurisdiction should attach
based on the relationship with the sovereign from whence the actor
hails. The approach also raises substantial due process and fairness
issues because it does not provide actors, who are present or have per-
sonal property in the forum, any means by which to challenge jurisdic-
tion.8 0 For these reasons, in the United States, jurisdiction based on
presence largely gave way to the more robust system of minimum con-
tacts, and the Supreme Court abolished quasi in rem jurisdiction. 81
Courts, such as the French court in the Yahoo! litigations, often
rely on jurisdiction in international disputes based on presence and
quasi in rem because the approach only requires that a territorial sov-
ereign have the power to enforce a judgment. 82 This reliance allows
courts to ignore the difficult task of determining whether exercise of
that power is normatively desirable. 83 Yet, as the United States and the
world have become more interconnected and territorial sovereigns
now have significant overlapping powers of enforcement, 84 such a
"might makes right" system defies logic. If territorial sovereigns all ex-
ercise jurisdiction to the full scope of their power, international actors
may well view the sovereigns as being protectionist. Protectionist ac-
tions could serve to hamper the global trade upon which future pros-
perity may depend. 85 Thus, international relations and the success of
77. Pennoyer was decided in 1877. Id.
78. "America during the nineteenth century was a society of island communities."
ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER: 1877-1920, at xiii (1967).
79. This loophole was not really closed until the advent of the effects test. See infra
Part II1.
80. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
81. Id.; Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207, 210 (1977).
82. See Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared
and Evaluated, 63 B.U. L. REv. 279, 285-87 (1983).
83. Id. at 338 ("[A] legal order [that views jurisdiction in terms of power] will simply
want to ensure that its arsenal of jurisdictional bases is sufficiently large and varied to
permit the legal order to assume jurisdiction whenever it has power and is concerned with
a party or the underlying controversy.").
84. The United States and France had overlapping jurisdiction in the Yahoo! litiga-
tion. See supra Part 1.
85. See Richard Stevenson, Global Trade Strengthens Economies, Greenspan Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2000, at C2 (noting how Greenspan used his address to emphasize that
global trade strengthens economies).
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the global economy could suffer as international actors fear the un-
due influence of these protectionist actions.
The Internet creates even greater potential for overlapping pow-
ers of enforcement as "[b] order-crossing events and transactions, pre-
viously at the margins of the legal system . . . have migrated, in
cyberspace, to the core of that system. '8 6 Some have argued that real-
space limitations will attenuate any harm caused by cross-border en-
forcement because "governments can use their coercive powers only
within their borders and can control offshore internet communica-
tions only by controlling local intermediaries, local assets, and local per-
sons."8 7 Yet, these powers are significant, and pose a real risk to many
internet actors, including individuals.
For example, most European countries restrict free speech in
ways United States courts would likely deem unconstitutional."8 If a
European country exercises jurisdiction based on presence to the full
extent of its power, it could serve and detain an American tourist for
speech uttered online, which the tourist did not intentionally direct at
the country. Worse yet, the country's authorities could detain the
tourist for the speech of others.8 9 As one prominent commentator
noted, this type of approach "could easily have a chilling effect on
travel."90 However, jurisdiction based on power to enforce through
presence and quasi in rem puts more at risk than merely one's ability
to travel.
Jurisdiction over all perceived harms under this approach, what
this Comment refers to as contacts only jurisdiction, also poses the
most significant threat to the Internet itself.91 It allows countries with
86. David G. Post, Against "Against Cyberanarchy" 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1365, 1383
(2002).
87. GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 1, at 159.
88. See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113
YALE L.J. 1151, 1209-11 (2004).
89. Cf Edmund L. Andrews, Germany Charges Compuserve Manager, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,
1997, at D19 (detailing how German authorities indicted a Compuserve manager for fail-
ing to prevent content considered illegal in Germany from reaching German citizens
through a Compuserve message board).
90. Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization ofJurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 311, 409-10
(2002).
91. This Comment refers to quasi in rem and presence as "contacts only" forms of
jurisdiction. As in the French Yahoo! decision, quasi in rem based jurisdiction can give the
power to enforce a judgment rendered over a single harmful "contact." In that case, the
French court stated that it was competent to exercise jurisdiction because there was a harm
suffered in France, and even though the court recognized the harm was not intentional,
the court noted it could liquidate Yahoo!'s assets to enforce the judgment. See supra note
25 and accompanying text.
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the strictest legal regimes to impose their norms on the Internet as a
whole. 92 The approach disproportionately affects large service or con-
tent providers that have significant assets or employees in many forum
countries. 93 Under it, countries may seize assets and employees of any
local subsidiary even if it is not directly involved in the dispute. 94
Contacts only jurisdiction also creates problems of overinclusive-
ness and underinclusiveness. The approach allows countries to en-
force a judgment in any case of perceived harm regardless of whether
an actor intentionally targeted the forum. Meanwhile, purposeful con-
tact directed at the forum by a smaller internet actor may go unpun-
ished, leaving victims uncompensated, because presence and quasi in
rem provide no basis for jurisdiction when the defendant is absent
and holds no assets in the forum.
B. Minimum Contacts-Jurisdiction Based on Reasonableness
The minimum contacts approach for jurisdiction better serves
the interests of comity between sovereigns 95 and arose to replace the
aging and troublesome approach of presence and quasi in rem based
jurisdiction in the United States.96 The test improves upon the pres-
ence and quasi in rem approach by performing two related functions.
"It protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant
or inconvenient forum[,] ' ' 9 7 and it ensures that "[s]tates, through
their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by
their status as coequal sovereigns .... -98 Under a minimum contacts
analysis, a state "may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant only so long as there exist 'minimum contacts' between the
defendant and the forum" such that it is reasonable to require the
actor to defend against suit there.99 Because it has a more limited
scope and reserves a place for a normative judgment on reasonable-
92. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
93. See, e.g., supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text; see also GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note
1, at 8.
95. Under the general rules of comity: "A foreign nation judgment will not be recog-
nized in the United States unless the American court is convinced that the foreign court
had jurisdiction and that 'there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before
a court of competentjurisdiction .... .'" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98
cmt. c (1971) (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202 (1895)).
96. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
97. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 291.
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ness, minimum contacts allows for greater cooperation and communi-
cation among sovereigns than contacts only jurisdiction.
Courts may find minimum contacts analysis helpful for determin-
ing jurisdiction over an internet actor, especially when the actor also
has substantial physical contacts with the forum in addition to its on-
line contacts. In that instance, a court may consider an online contact
along with the actor's other significant contacts to support a finding
of jurisdiction. 10 However, the approach poses significant analytical
problems in instances when an actor's contacts occur solely over the
Internet.
Minimum contacts analysis alone may be ill equipped to deal with
those situations in which an actor does not maintain physical contacts
with the forum country. If courts establish jurisdiction based exclu-
sively on an actor's online contacts without further inquiry, then ac-
tors engaging in passive conduct, legal in their forum, could be
subject to jurisdiction in more than one distant forum simultaneously,
much like Yahoo! was and likely still is. Consequently, some courts in
the United States have determined that passive conduct on the In-
ternet fails to constitute sufficient minimum contacts for establishing
jurisdiction.' 0 ' Effectively, these courts have formed a threshold re-
quirement, which exempts online actors who do not engage in active
or purposeful conduct. The active conduct requirement helps to pre-
serve the reasonableness standard of minimum contacts, but it creates
a ponderous additional level of inquiry. Under it, courts must ascer-
tain whether conduct is active or passive. 0 2
In Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc.,103 the District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania developed a "sliding scale test" to
determine whether conduct was active or passive. 10 4 Zippo involved a
trademark infringement suit by the manufacturer of Zippo brand
lighters against a news service that used "zippo" in several of its do-
100. See, e.g., Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir.
2004) (analyzing defendants contacts, which included a website accessible in California,
and finding that the contacts were not sufficient for California to have jurisdiction over the
defendant).
101. See, e.g., Machulsky v. Hall, 210 F. Supp. 2d 531, 544 (D.N.J. 2002) (finding that a
single transaction on eBay did not confer jurisdiction on the seller's forum because it was
too passive); Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 727 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (finding
that a post on a listserv was too passive for establishing jurisdiction).
102. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa.
1997).
103. Id.
104. Id.
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main names. 105 In weighing whether personal jurisdiction over the de-
fendant was proper, the district court noted, "[O]ur review of the
available cases and materials reveals that the likelihood that personal
jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate
to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity con-
ducts over the Internet."10 6
The district court explained that, on either extreme of the sliding
scale, whether the court has jurisdiction would be easy to assess. 10 7 But
the court recognized that for cases falling in the middle ground, it
would be necessary to examine "the level of interactivity and commer-
cial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web
site."10 8 Yet, the court described neither how this analysis should take
place nor where exactly the line falls as to whether jurisdiction should
be granted or not, leaving future courts to figure out the analysis on
their own.
The blurry standard as to what constitutes minimum contacts cre-
ates significant notice problems. Outside the cyberspace context, de-
spite substantial case law on the subject, courts in the United States
have not determined a bright-line test for minimum contacts. 10 9 The
sliding scale test developed for situations involving online contacts
also lacks a clear standard. °1 0 Without a clear line as to whether cer-
tain actions meet jurisdictional requirements, an internet actor may
not know if its actions will subject it to jurisdiction in a distant forum
until after the fact. This approach may cause internet actors to avoid
interactive or commercial content that would put them in the middle
of the sliding scale, as such content would make jurisdiction in a dis-
tant forum a possibility. In this way, the lack of notice as to what does,
and what does not, meet minimum contacts requirements could harm
future development of the Internet.
105. Id. at 1121.
106. Id. at 1124.
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. This statement is generally true for minimum contacts analysis regardless of
whether the test is used for determining jurisdiction in the offline or online context. See
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (noting that in order
to determine whether hailing defendant to the forum is reasonable may require inquiry
into other relevant factors). However, some courts have attempted to make the test more
definite. SeeYahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199,
1205-06 (9th Cir. 2006).
110. See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124; see also supra notes 103-108 and accompanying
text.
[Vol. 41
THE EFFECTS TEST FOR CYBERSPACE DISPUTES
Minimum contacts presents a better, more adaptable solution
than quasi in rem and presence based jurisdiction because it allows
for inquiry into reasonableness. International recognition of mini-
mum contacts analysis means barriers to implementing the approach
could be low." ' 1 However, a minimum contacts analysis is not without
problems. Although the test works reasonably well for large service or
content providers with significant physical contacts in the forum,1 12
under a theory of general jurisdiction, a court may still force those
companies to face financial risk for actions not intentionally directed
at the forum.' 13 Additionally, jurisdiction based on minimum contacts
fares much worse when all of the contacts with the forum take place
through the Internet. As illustrated above, the test may present analyt-
ical problems for courts and notice problems for the actors whose
contacts occur online.
C. International Treaty and Adjudication-Jurisdiction Based on
Agreement
In terms of comity, the most legitimate approach to establishing
international jurisdiction would be through the use of a binding inter-
national agreement. An international agreement could either estab-
lish international substantive law or an international organization to
hear cyberspace disputes.
As one potential solution to the problems presented by cyber-
space jurisdiction disputes, countries could enter a binding interna-
tional agreement, establishing the method that the courts of
signatories would apply to determine jurisdiction. A well-known com-
mentator in the field of cyberspace law once noted, "if a universal
substantive law were applied around the world, many of the concerns
about borders, conflicting law, and impermissible extraterritorial reg-
111. Europe also has its own form of contacts analysis. See Reidenberg, supra note 31, at
1955 ("Similar standards exist in foreign states where a court's competence to hear the
case depends on the defendant's nexus with the forum state" as shown through the "vari-
ous forms of contact between defendants and the state asserting jurisdiction.").
112. See, e.g., Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir.
2004) (noting that Fred Martin had contacts with California in addition to its internet site,
including the use of sales contracts with choice-of-law provisions specifying California law,
the retaining of a California-based direct-mail marketing company, and the hiring of a
sales training company incorporated in California).
113. See generally Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408
(1984). "When a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not arising
out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum, the State has been said to be
exercising 'general jurisdiction' over the defendant." Id. at 414 n.9.
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ulation would disappear." 114 However, two fundamental problems in-
terfere with the establishment of an international agreement on
jurisdiction: first, most agreements of this nature lack effective means
of enforcement; and second, agreements that include effective en-
forcement provisions rarely, if ever, achieve international consensus.
Of the few international treaties that currently exist to deal with
transnational disputes, most have weak enforcement mechanisms.'l 5
A simple reason for the weakness exists-signatory countries are un-
willing to relinquish any of their sovereign power to enforce. 116 For
instance, the Berne Convention, 1 7 a copyright treaty, sought to estab-
lish a set of minimum requirements to which all signatory states must
adhere, but, when the final form of the treaty was realized, the actual
minimum requirements were easy to meet.' 8 Although these minimal
requirements eased implementation, they resulted in a mere codifica-
tion of laws already adopted by the member states.'" 9 In essence, trea-
ties like the Berne Convention sound nice on paper but accomplish
little international reform.
In the unlikely event that a treaty is to have real bite, such as a
robust enforcement or adjudication mechanism, little likelihood ex-
ists that countries would ratify and implement the treaty. For example,
the Hague Convention on foreign judgments in civil and commercial
matters,' 20 which represents an attempt to harmonize international
enforcement ofjudgments, has failed to garner an international con-
sensus for fifteen years.121 Some of the points of contention concern
114. Berman, supra note 90, at 392.
115. See, e.g., Paris Act Relating to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works of September 9, 1886, concludedJuly 24, 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [herein-
after Berne Convention]. The Berne Convention only requires signatory countries to grant
foreign authors the same rights as nationals have, a practice that was already common in
developed countries. Id. at 35; see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why
National Courts Should Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 469, 490-93 (2000).
116. See Dinwoodie, supra note 115, at 490 (noting that the Berne Convention "in-
truded only marginally on the autonomy of signatory states to establish national copyright
policy").
117. Berne Convention, supra note 115.
118. Dinwoodie, supra note 115, at 490-91.
119. Id. at 493 ("Those agreements that [the Berne Convention] produced were, in
large part, codifications of commonly held, and already nationally implemented, copyright
policies ....").
120. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, Feb. 1, 1971, 1144 U.N.T.S. 249 (commonly known as the Hague
Convention).
121. See, e.g., Paul Hofheinz, Birth Pangsfor Web Treaty Seem Endless, WALL ST.J., Aug. 16,
2001, at All.
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the test for jurisdiction, generally, and the test for jurisdiction over
online disputes, in particular. 22
As another potential solution to the problems presented by cyber-
space jurisdiction disputes, countries could enter a binding interna-
tional agreement, establishing an international body to oversee
international cases involving cyberspace harms. However, such a body
may pose a new set of problems, as it may fail to enfranchise the
masses subject to its jurisdiction.1 23 Unlike parliaments or Congress,
international bodies like the World Trade Organization are said to
have a "'democratic deficit' because [their] lawmakers lack electoral
responsibility" to the people, and yet these lawmakers, often political
appointees, wield considerable power.1 24 Further, an organization
with jurisdictional power over international cyberspace disputes may
inhibit or even quash regional development of the Internet because "a
decision of [an international] dispute resolution body may not only
establish international norms, but also may entrench those norms,
freezing them in place and preempting the ability of various countries
to experiment with different approaches." 12 5
The future may reveal a more feasible, democratic approach for
establishing international adjudicatory regimes and enforcement bod-
ies, but until that time, countries must choose whether to adopt a solu-
tion for their peoples on an individual basis, which serves their
interests at home and abroad. A failure to do so could leave those
countries powerless to address harms that occur within their territo-
ries. Thus, the effects test warrants consideration because it presents
perhaps the best way for countries to address cyberspace harms; it
maximizes the benefits of the alternative approaches considered
above, while remaining capable of implementation.
III. The Effects Test as a Way to Avoid the L Effects of
Other Jurisdictional Approaches, Without Sacrificing
Their Benefits
The Ninth Circuit's effects test, as applied in Yahoo! Inc. v. La
Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L 'Antisemitisme, should be the primary means
122. Berman, supra note 90, at 395.
123. David Post has said, "I don't see any good solutions, right now at least, to how we
build global institutions that have the trust of the people who are subjected to their rules
and regulations." Thomas E. Baker ed., A Roundtable Discussion with Lawrence Lessig, David
G. Post &Jeffrey Rosen, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 441, 443 (2001).
124. Berman, supra note 90, at 398-99.
125. Id. at 400.
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by which countries establish jurisdiction in international cyberspace
disputes. The effects test provides a better means by which to deter-
mine cyberspace jurisdiction because it recognizes that the nature of
the Internet may lead to situations where users access content in unex-
pected jurisdictions. It also has more pros and fewer cons than other
schemes for determining jurisdiction in the online context. Courts
could implement the effects test without facing significant barriers, as
comity would ease adoption. Further, courts in the United States have
already acknowledged the effects test in other areas of law, and it con-
tinues to gain currency worldwide in the online context.
A. The Effects Test-Fewer Problems and a Better Solution
The effects test presents a substantial improvement over other
tests for determining jurisdiction in cases of online conduct. The
United States Supreme Court originally designed the test to deal with
situations where as little as one contact with a distant forum supports
the exercise of jurisdiction and specifically allowed for that contact to
occur through a media service. 126 Thus, the effects test suits cyber-
space disputes particularly well because it allows for jurisdiction even
when there are no physical contacts with the forum. 127
Under the Ninth Circuit's formulation, the effects test has three
simple elements: intent, targeting, and foreseeable harm.1 28 To meet
the first element of the test, a plaintiff that seeks to hail a foreign
defendant to its home forum would first have to show that the defen-
dant subjectively intended for its online contacts to reach that fo-
rum.' 29 To meet the second element, the plaintiff would have to show
that the contact displayed characteristics, evincing that the plaintiff
targeted the forum, or rather, adapted its contact in such a way as to
elicit an improved response from the forum.'30 While the analysis of
these two related elements may sound cumbersome, an actor's online
contacts readily provide the circumstantial evidence needed to prove
or disprove the elements. For international cases, one aspect of the
126. See generally Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (finding jurisdiction when the
contact with the forum was through a newspaper article that allegedly defamed the
plaintiff).
127. The defendant in Calder caused harm through an article written and edited in
Florida but viewable in the forum state. Id. at 785.
128. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199,
1206 (9th Cir. 2006). For an explanation of how this Comment matches up short terms for
the elements with the court's actual language, see supra note 46.
129. See Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1209.
130. Id.
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contacts would be dispositive: whether an internet actor's contact ad-
dressed users of a distant forum in their native language as opposed to
the language of users in the actor's home forum.' 3 '
The last element of the effects test, that of foreseeable harm, 132
provides a shield to prevent an actor from being unreasonably hailed
to defend suit in a distant forum. This "shield" makes the effects test
even more unlike contacts only jurisdiction, which allows a court to
redress harms whether foreseeable or not. Thus, the test creates a rel-
atively bright-line rule, and it dispenses with the need to evaluate the
vague notions of active or passive contacts. Taken together, the ele-
ments provide for jurisdiction to decide only those matters directly
relating to an internet actor's intentional contacts and the natural
consequences thereof, but not for unintentional or unforeseeable
harms. In this way, the effects test establishes superior notice as each
element of the test requires some level of culpability. The heightened
notice provides a rule whereby a defendant who meets the test cannot
claim a contact with the forum was accidental, 133 a benefit that some
of the other approaches for establishing cyberspace jurisdiction lack.
Another benefit of the effects test is that it requires countries to
rise above some of their petty differences and to look beyond their
self-interested motivations for exercising jurisdiction. But this benefit
may also be the effects test's biggest detriment, and it could signifi-
cantly hinder implementation. Under the test, countries may have to
forgo the tangible benefit of redressing all harms caused by actors
against which they would have power to enforce a judgment. Instead,
these countries would have to trust in intangible benefits, such as bet-
ter international business relations and protection of domestic actors
from suit for their unintended foreign harms. 134 It may prove difficult
for any government to look beyond the immediate detriment of losing
some of its power to enforce judgments against any and all harms it
perceives within its borders and instead to focus on future intangible
benefits. Yet, the effects test calls for just that.
131. In terms of Yahoo!'s actions, the question would be whether Yahoo!'s site ad-
dressed French users in French as opposed to American English.
132. Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1206.
133. Id. at 1206, 1209-11.
134. Cf Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Case, 17 GA. J.
INT'L & ComP. L. 1, 29 (1987) ("[E]xorbitant assertions of judicial jurisdiction by United
States courts may offend foreign sovereigns, [and] these claims can provoke diplomatic
protests, trigger commercial or judicial retaliation, and threaten friendly relations in unre-
lated fields.") (citations omitted).
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Hence, the effects test may not be perfect, but it does solve many
of the problems of the alternative approaches. The bright-line rule
established by the test serves to enhance notice to online actors and to
make analysis less burdensome for the courts. The test also addresses
the problem of overinclusiveness because, unlike contacts only juris-
diction, which is based on the power to enforce, the effects test denies
jurisdiction for perceived harms that result when an actor's services or
content "leak" across borders accidentally.135 The test thereby inhibits
the extraterritorial enforcement of laws, preventing the restriction of
online conduct legal in the intended forum. Yet, the test also ad-
dresses the problem of underinclusiveness by awarding jurisdiction for
harms that result from intentional conduct targeted at the forum, re-
gardless of whether the actor has assets in the forum. 136 As illustrated
below, an additional benefit of the effects test is that it does not pose
the problems of implementation inherent to the international agree-
ment approach.
B. The Effects Test-Implementation Through Comity
Unlike a formal international agreement, countries could imple-
ment the effects test through the already prevalent ideal of comity
between nations. As a commentator once explained, one aspect of
comity "relates to the forum [country's] self-interest in making [juris-
diction] decisions that will further the development of an effectively
functioning international system." 137 Most countries have an interest
in applying their laws to extraterritorial actors that cause harms within
their borders.138 Likewise, most countries want to protect their resi-
dent citizens, companies, and organizations from the extraterritorial
reach of other nations' laws.' 39 The effects test balances these two in-
terests when the harm occurs in cyberspace. It allows a country to ap-
ply its laws beyond its borders to internet actors when they engage in
intentional conduct directed at the forum, but protects internet actors
135. The intent and knowledge elements help to avoid a finding of jurisdiction where
content or services are accidentally available in the forum. See supra notes 46, 129-34 and
accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., Yahoo! 433 F.3d at 1201-02 (finding jurisdiction over LICRA in California
because it intentionally targeted Yahoo!'s United States based online business with a court
order).
137. Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between
Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 283 (1982).
138. See, e.g., BELLIA ET AL., supra note 25, at 105.
139. See, e.g., Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F.
Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (finding jurisdiction over LICRA and finding that the
French order is unenforceable).
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whose conduct reaches the forum unintentionally, even if the actors
have assets in the forum. 140
Comity also solves the problem of enforcement of judgments
under the effects test by encouraging reciprocal enforcement. As one
of its central tenets, comity "bears on the maintenance of amicable
external relations with other nation-states and stresses the importance
of extending courtesy to other sovereigns and reciprocal recognition
of national governmental interests."14 1 Countries that enact jurisdic-
tional policies based on an effects test can choose to enforce judg-
ments rendered in other countries that have faithfully applied a
similar test. To do so would show "courtesy" to that country in the
advancement of comity concerns, fostering favorable relations be-
tween sovereigns. 1 42 Such a means of implementation would bear sim-
ilarities to the position once advocated by Lawrence Lessig, a well-
known scholar in the field of cyberspace law, whereby territorial sover-
eigns agree to enforce the laws of others so that their laws may like-
wise be enforced. 143 Each country with domestic and foreign internet
actors can gain something from streamlining jurisdictional determina-
tions. The effects test provides the best means to accomplish that type
of reform while allowing for implementation one country at a time.
Some jurisdictions already recognize its benefits, and the process of
adoption has already started.
C. The Effects Test-A Few Practical Applications
While notable, the Ninth Circuit's characterization of the effects
test hardly showed true novelty. In the United States, courts already
apply the test to other areas of law, while courts in foreign jurisdic-
tions have used the test for some types of international cyberspace
disputes. These applications of the effects test demonstrate the viabil-
ity of the approach.
140. See supra Part II.B.
141. Maier, supra note 137, at 283.
142. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
143. Under Lessig's concept of reciprocal enforcement, "[e]ach state would promise to
enforce on servers within its jurisdiction the regulations of other states for citizens from
those other states, in exchange for having its own regulations enforced in other jurisdic-
tions." LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 55 (1999). However, the
effects test does not require active policing by the state where the actor resides as Lessig's
model does. Id.
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1. Some Examples of the Effects Test in the United States
As noted above, the Ninth Circuit borrowed heavily from the Su-
preme Court's Calder decision to formulate its version of the effects
test. That decision, rendered in 1983, sits as one of the first instances
where a nation's high court validated an effects test approach to
jurisdiction. 144
In Calder, the respondent brought suit in California Superior
Court, claiming an article in the National Inquirer, written and edited
in Florida, had libeled her. 14 5 As it heard the case, the Supreme Court
considered whether jurisdiction in a distant forum could be proper
when the defendant only maintained a single contact with the fo-
rum. 1 46 There, the single contact was the content of the allegedly
libelous article.1 47 The Court noted that the National Inquirer had a
broader subscription base in California than it did in Florida.1 4 8 Thus,
the Court found that the defendant intentionally aimed the content
of the article, and therefore the wrongful acts, at the forum. 149 It held,
'Jurisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper in California based
on the 'effects' of their Florida conduct in California.'
150
More recently, in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,15 1 the
Supreme Court addressed whether an effects test applies to interna-
tional violations of the antitrust laws of the Sherman Act.15 2 Hartford
involved a cartel of reinsurers that agreed to boycott general liability
insurers that used nonconforming forms. 53 There, the Court found
that "foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact pro-
duce some substantial effect in the United States" is sufficient for es-
tablishing jurisdiction. 154
144. See William J. Knudson, Jr., Keeton, Calder, Helicopteros and Burger King-Interna-
tional Shoe's Most Recent Progeny, 39 U. MIAMi L. REV. 809, 819-20 (1985). However, it should
be noted that, arguably, the Supreme Court first validated an effects test approach in
United States v. Aluminum Co. ofAmerica, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), as the Supreme Court
certified that case to be heard by the Second Circuit. Marina Lao, Reclaiming a Role for Intent
Evidence in Monopolization Analysis, 54 AM. U. L. REv. 151, 160 n.42 (2004).
145. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 784 (1984).
146. See id. at 788.
147. Id. at 788-89.
148. Id. at 790.
149. Id. at 789-90.
150. Id. at 789.
151. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
152. Id. at 796.
153. Id. at 776.
154. Id. at 796.
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It is worth noting that United States v. Aluminum Co. of America ("A/-
coa")155 first advocated an effects test requiring an intent factor for
alleged violations of the Sherman Act and that the reasoning of the
Second Circuit's decision in Alcoa arguably obeys the comity princi-
ples this Comment advances far more than the Hartford decision
does. 15 6 Nonetheless, before the Supreme Court's decision in Hart-
ford, court decisions differed on the level of effects necessary for a
court to find jurisdiction. 157 While the Alcoa court required inten-
tional effects, some courts determined jurisdiction in a contacts only
fashion.1 58 But the Supreme Court settled the issue, adopting a test
very similar to the one the Ninth Circuit used in Yahoo!.
The Hartford effects test's requirements for conduct that was
'meant to produce" and that "did in fact produce" an effect in the
United States mirror the intent and targeting elements of the Ninth
Circuit's test, and the requirement for a "substantial effect" provides a
shield similar to the foreseeable harm element. The similarity of the
two tests suggests the overarching usefulness of the effects test. If it
works for determining jurisdiction in antitrust disputes, it may work
just as well for determining jurisdiction in cyberspace disputes. After
all, both types of disputes have the potential for international scope.
155. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
156. S. Lynn Diamond, Note, Empagran, The FTAIA and Extraterritorial Effects: Guidance
to Courts Facing Questions of Antitrust Jurisdiction Still Lacking, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 805,
812-14 (2006). The high point for comity was Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549
F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). But Timberlane involved a cumbersome test that putjudges in the
role of making political choices, as it weighed the following: (1) "the degree of conflict
with foreign law or policy," (2) "the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the loca-
tions or principal places of businesses or corporations," (3) "the extent to which enforce-
ment by either state can be expected to achieve compliance," (4) "the relative significance
of effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere," (5) "the extent to which
there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce," (6) "the foreseeability of
such effect," and (7) "the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within
the United States as compared with conduct abroad." Id. at 614. Unlike Timberlane, this
Comment advances principles of comity as a means to aid implementation, not as a means
for determining jurisdiction itself.
157. See, e.g., Cont'l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704
(1962); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 288 (1952); United States v. Sisal Sales
Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 268-76 (1927); see also Hartford, 509 U.S. at 796 (noting that the appli-
cation of the effects test was, in earlier days, "not always free from doubt").
158. See, e.g., United States v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Packet-Fahrtactien-Gesellschaft,
200 F. 806, 807 (C.C.N.Y. 1911).
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2. Some Examples of How the Effects Test Is Gaining Currency
Worldwide
While the Ninth Circuit sits among the few courts in the United
States to have applied the effects test in the online context, courts in
other countries have also applied the effects test to determine cyber-
space jurisdiction. For example, the High Court of Australia used an
effects test analysis in Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick,159 and the High
Court ofJustice in the United Kingdom used a similar analysis in Rich-
ardson v. Schwaizenegger.160
Gutnick involved an article posted on Barron's Online, which al-
legedly defamed Mr. Gutnick, a resident of Australia. 161 Barron's On-
line houses its content on a United States based server. 162
Nevertheless, because the article directed statements at Mr. Gutnick
and caused alleged harm in Australia, 163 the Australian court found
jurisdiction appropriate over Dow Jones, the parent company of Bar-
ron's Online. 164
Richardson involved another instance of online defamation. 165
The plaintiff alleged that Arnold Schwarzenegger's campaign man-
ager falsely accused her of lying.166 Schwarzenegger's campaign man-
ager allowed himself to be quoted for an article that appeared on a
newspaper website, wherein he intimated that the plaintiff made up a
claim that Schwarzenegger "groped" her. 167 The English court found
the statements sufficient to establish jurisdiction because they were
targeted at the plaintiff and had arguably harmed her reputation in
the United Kingdom.' 68 Richardson is particularly important because it
shows that courts outside the United States can use the effects test to
establish jurisdiction over individual online actors, even when they do
not have significant assets in the forum country.1 69
These cases illustrate the successful adoption of the effects test in
jurisdictions other than the United States. Both the United Kingdom
159. (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575.
160. See Richardson v. Schwarzenegger, [2004] EWHC (QB) 2422 (Eng.).
161. Gutnick, 210 C.L.R. 575 2.
162. Id. 17; Reidenberg, supra note 31, at 1956.
163. Gutnick, 210 C.L.R. 575 100.
164. Id. 102.
165. Richardson, [2004] EWHC (QB) 2422.
166. Id. at [3]-[4].
167. Id. at [3].
168. Id. at [21], [22], [31].
169. The defendants in Richardson were all individuals domiciled in California. Richard-
son, [2004] EWHC (QB) 2422 [1].
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and Australia have used the test, and they have experienced success
with it. Other countries should now follow suit.
Conclusion
The version of the effects test that the Ninth Circuit used in Ya-
hoo! provides a superior means of establishing jurisdiction in cases of
cyberspace harm. It raises the bar so that jurisdiction will not be found
in a contacts only fashion, where only the harmful effects matter, and
the intent of the actor is irrelevant. The test also enhances notice to
internet actors, lowers analytical complexity for the courts, and avoids
punishing accidental harms. Further, comity interests would ease
adoption of the effects test, allowing for countries to experiment with
using the test before implementing it full scale.
As noted above, the current debate over international cyberspace
jurisdiction mirrors a similar debate that occurred over the past cen-
tury. In those earlier days of globalization, commentators argued
about the proper test for determining when a country could legiti-
mately engage in extraterritorial enforcement of its antitrust laws. 170
In the United States, the Supreme Court decided an effects test, much
like the one this Comment advocates, would be the most appropriate
means for establishing jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that
had violated the Sherman Act, answering the call of the commenta-
tors.171 Now the Internet has caused courts across the globe to face a
new quandary, but the answer is the same. The effects test can and
should be the standard by which all countries determine jurisdiction
for international disputes in the online context.
170. See generally Diane P. Wood, The Impossible Dream: Real International Antitrust, 1992
U. Cmi. LEGAL F. 277, 299-300 (1992).
171. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993).
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